Isolation facilities for highly infectious diseases in Europe - A cross-sectional analysis in 16 countries by Schilling, Stefan et al.
Isolation Facilities for Highly Infectious Diseases in
Europe – A Cross-Sectional Analysis in 16 Countries
Stefan Schilling1*, Francesco Maria Fusco2, Giuseppina De Iaco3, Barbara Bannister4,
Helena C. Maltezou5, Gail Carson6, Rene Gottschalk7, Hans-Reinhard Brodt8, Philippe Brouqui9,
Vincenzo Puro2, Giuseppe Ippolito2, for the European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases project
members"
1Department for Internal Medicine, Staedtische Kliniken Moenchengladbach, Moenchengladbach, Germany, 2Department for Infectious Diseases, National Institute for
Infectious Diseases ‘‘Lazarro Spallanzani’’, Rome, Italy, 3Department for Internal Medicine, Azienda Ospedaliero, Universitaria Ospedali Riuniti delle Marche, Torrette, Italy,
4Department for Infectious Diseases, The Royal Free Hospital, London, United Kingdom, 5Department for Interventions in Health-Care Facilities, Hellenic Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, Athens, Greece, 6Department of Rare and Imported Pathogens, Health Protection Agency, Porton, United Kingdom, 7Department for
Infectious Diseases, Port Health Authorities, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 8Department for Infectious Diseases, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany,
9Department for Infectious Diseases and Tropical Medicine, Marseilles University, Marseille, France
Abstract
Background: Highly Infectious Diseases (HIDs) are (i) easily transmissible form person to person; (ii) cause a life-threatening
illness with no or few treatment options; and (iii) pose a threat for both personnel and the public. Hence, even suspected
HID cases should be managed in specialised facilities minimizing infection risks but allowing state-of-the-art critical care.
Consensus statements on the operational management of isolation facilities have been published recently. The study
presented was set up to compare the operational management, resources, and technical equipment among European
isolation facilities. Due to differences in geography, population density, and national response plans it was hypothesized
that adherence to recommendations will vary.
Methods and Findings: Until mid of 2010 the European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases conducted a cross-sectional
analysis of isolation facilities in Europe, recruiting 48 isolation facilities in 16 countries. Three checklists were disseminated,
assessing 44 items and 148 specific questions. The median feedback rate for specific questions was 97.9% (n = 47/48) (range:
n = 7/48 (14.6%) to n = 48/48 (100%). Although all facilities enrolled were nominated specialised facilities’ serving countries
or regions, their design, equipment and personnel management varied. Eighteen facilities fulfilled the definition of a High
Level Isolation Unit’. In contrast, 24 facilities could not operate independently from their co-located hospital, and five could
not ensure access to equipment essential for infection control. Data presented are not representative for the EU in general,
as only 16/27 (59.3%) of all Member States agreed to participate. Another limitation of this study is the time elapsed
between data collection and publication; e.g. in Germany one additional facility opened in the meantime.
Conclusion: There are disparities both within and between European countries regarding the design and equipment of
isolation facilities. With regard to the International Health Regulations, terminology, capacities and equipment should be
standardised.
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Introduction
The term highly infectious diseases (HID) defines mostly viral
and bacterial infections that (i) are easily transmissible from person
to person; (ii) cause a life-threatening clinical illness with no or few
treatment options; and (iii) pose a threat for both health care
workers and the public, thus requiring specific infection control
measures and public health planning [1]. Included in this
definition are viral haemorrhagic fevers (e.g. Filo-, Arena- or
Bunyavirus infections); some respiratory syndromes (e.g. severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-Coronavirus, or pneumonic
plague); as well as any (re2) emerging infectious agent transmis-
sible from person-to-person [2]. In Europe, HIDs have caused
several events within the last decade: SARS affected eight
European nations in 2003; Lassa virus has repeatedly been
imported to Europe; and Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever
virus infections are increasing in several Mediterranean regions,
and have also been imported to central Europe and the United
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Kingdom (UK) [3–7]. Recently detected agents like the new
human Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus underline
the continuous challenge faced [8].
Patients with suspected or proven HIDs should be cared for in a
clinical environment that provides safe, secure, high-quality, and
appropriate care with optimal infection containment, prevention
and control procedures [1]. Consensus statements on the
operational management and design of isolation facilities have
been published in Europe and the United States of America [1;9].
In addition, the European Commission has funded projects to
enhance early recognition of cases by training front-line health
care workers (HCWs) and standardizing diagnostic methodology
[10–12]. Despite such efforts, no pooled data on isolation facilities
resources, such as infrastructure design, technical equipment,
capacity and access to intensive care, do exist.
The study presented was performed by the European Network
for Highly Infectious Diseases, EuroNHID, and set up to compare
the operational management, resources, and technical equipment
among isolation facilities with recommendations published. Due to
differences in geography, population density, national response
plans, and experience with HIDs in participating countries, it was
hypothesized that the level of adherence to recommendations may
vary. The objective of this article is to present data about
infrastructure design and resources, technical equipment, available
personnel, and access to intensive care.
Methods
Setting
EuroNHID consists of infectious disease clinicians and public
health officers with expertise in the management of HIDs
identified via their National Health Authorities. Administrative
and scientific aspects are managed by an Italian Coordination
Team, and a Steering Committee, including partners from France,
Germany, Greece, and the UK. Both committees started their
work in 2007, and reported all organizational and scientific
developments to the project members. Names and countries of all
project members are listed above.\
Study design
Three checklists were developed and based on project-
member’s experience, available literature, national preparedness
plans, and guidelines of international authorities for the manage-
ment of HIDs [13]. Each checklist contained questions addressing
specific items of interest, and answers were structured as open-
ended, closed, semi-open or free text options. Overall, the
checklists included 44 items and 148 specific questions.
Checklist one contained three major sections: Infrastructure;
technical equipment; and personnel management. A fourth section
on Emergency Departments was not obligatory [14]. All checklists
can be downloaded after free registration from: www.EUNID.eu.
The checklists underwent a pilot application to identify
structural gaps and sources of misinterpretation [13]. The facilities
of the Steering Committee members and one external facility
applied the checklists and cross-checked all itmes for their
applicability, but no external validation process was conducted.
Following minor changes, the checklists were disseminated to all
eligible facilities until December 2009 and expected to be re-
submitted within three months. Data provided were cross-checked
by personal on-site visits by a coordination team member in all but
four centres enrolled. Investigator (the National Project Repre-
sentative) and observer (the Coordination Team member) bias
may be ruled out, as all data recorded were cross-checked on-site
and agreed with the facilities operational manager or director.
Participants
Until November 2009, the Coordination Team collected data
on eligible isolation facilities to be included into the survey.
National Health Authorities of all European Union (EU) member
states were contacted to identify their will to participate.
Participating National Health Authorities were requested to
identify clinical facilities responsible for the admission, assessment,
and care of HID patients in their country, and to nominate a
National Project Representative.
Role of the funding source
EuroNHID was co-funded by the European Commission/
Director General for Consumers and Health (DG SANCO) for an
initial period of 36 months and extended to 42 months without
additional funding. A technical and scientific report on all data
collected during the project was delivered to the Commission in
December 2010. For details please follow: http://ec.europa.eu/
research/health/infectious-diseases/emerging-epidemics/projects/
143_en.html.
Results
Participants
Until mid of 2010, 48 isolation facilities in 16 European
countries were recruited into this survey (Table 1). Recruitment
was closed by the end of 2009 with the exception of Norway, who
received questionnaires by end of 2009 and submitted data by
spring of 2010. Data collection and on-site visits were finalised in
spring 2010. Except for Norway, all participating countries were
EU member states. Data were collected from all existing facilities
in participating countries except for Spain, where data were only
collected in the Catalonia region. Overall, the median feedback
rate for checklist 1 was 97.9% (n= 47/48), with a range from
n=7/48 (14.6%) to n= 48/48 (100%) of centres providing valid
answers to specific questions. All data provided in this article
represent a minimum feedback from 44 facilities (.90%).
Background data on facilities evaluated
The majority of facilities were constructed or underwent major
re-construction in the year 2001 or later (n = 32/47; 66.7%) and
are located on the same campus or in direct connection with a
general hospital (n = 41/48; 85.4%). Most facilities have designat-
ed rooms (n = 23/48; 47.9%) or wards (n = 18/48; 37.5%) located
within other hospital structures, and seven facilities are located
within a separate building (n = 7/48; 14.6%). National guidelines
for the construction of isolation facilities were available for 17
facilities whereas 29 were (re2) constructed in the absence of
specific requirements (37% and 63%, respectively). Three facilities
accept paediatric (6.3%), and 14 (29.2%) accept adult patients,
only, whereas most facilities provide care for both (n = 31/48;
64.6%). The number of isolation beds per facility ranges from one
to 56, with a median of 9.3 beds for adult and 7.2 for paediatric
patients. With respect to the overall population, the number of
beds ranges from 0.05 to 17.9 per one million inhabitants (median:
1.7) (Table 1). The majority of all facilities uses their beds on a
daily basis for routine patients (n = 37/48; 77,1%), while the
remainder provide bed capacities reserved for HID cases, only
(n = 11/48, 22.9%).
Except for the United Kingdom, all countries (n = 46/48;
95.4%) use barrier nursing techniques with high level Personal
Protective Equipment (hl-PPE) (21). 37 facilities (n = 37/46;
80.4%) have a response time of less than five hours after a case
is notified, the remainder demand up to 10 hours to be fully
operational (n = 9/46; 19.6%). Only eight (16.7%) of all facilities
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evaluated lacked any experience in the management of suspected
or proven HID cases. Among the remainder, most had experience
with infections due to SARS (n= 13/48; 27.8%), and viral
haemorrhagic fevers (n = 9/48; 18.8%).
Technical equipment
Essential technical requirements for isolation facilities includes:
Negative pressure in the isolation room(s); an anteroom; aerosol-
tight doors and windows; High Efficacy Particulate Air (HEPA)
filtration of exhausted air; and a surface of walls, floors and ceiling
withstanding disinfection procedures [1]. All but five facilities
enrolled (n = 43/48; 89.6%) provide negative pressure in the
isolation area, and the majority (n = 34/48; 70.8%) is also
equipped with all other essential equipment investigated. In
facilities with two or less additional items, most often HEPA
filtration of exhausted air and anterooms were missing (n = 7 and
5/14 facilities, respectively) (Figure 1).
Additional technical requirements not considered essential, but
benefitting infection control and HCW safety, includes: self-closing
doors; audio and/or visual negative pressure indicators; an
exclusive evacuation pathway; and an internal communication
system (for HCW-HCW and HCW-patient communication) [1].
At least 3 additional technical requirements are found in the
majority of facilities (n = 34/48; 70.8%). Most often, an internal
communication system (n= 43/48; 89.6%) and negative pressure
indicators (n = 40/48; 83.3%) were present, while an exclusive
evacuation pathway was missing in half of all facilities enrolled
(n = 27/48, 56.3%).
Access to Intensive Care
Thirty-three facilities (68.8%) provide intensive care, available
for patients within the isolation facility. Twelve facilities (25%) rely
on a designated isolation room within standard intensive care
units, three (6.3%) have no access to intensive care capacities
(Figure 2). Equipment for the monitoring of vital parameters and
advanced life support is available in all 48 facilities. In contrast,
mechanical ventilators are available either permanently in twelve
(25%) or on call in thirty-two facilities (66.7%), but not accessible
at all in four (8.3%). Forty-two facilities (87.5%) have either
permanent or on-call access to blood gas analyzers, whereas six
have not (12.5%). Hence, out of forty-five facilities reporting
intensive care provision, one (2.2%) lacks a mechanical ventilator,
and three (6.7%) have no ability to monitor their ventilation
therapy.
Personnel
Almost all facilities (93.6%; n= 44/47) report permanent access
to specifically trained infectious diseases doctors. 45/48 (93.75%)
facilities report providing intensive care, but only 34 of those
(75.5%) have access to specifically trained intensive care specialists.
In addition, out of 34 facilities indicating to provide care for
pediatric HID patients, only 11 (32.4%) report either permanent
or on-call access to pediatricians. Compared with available
doctors, even fewer facilities report access to specifically trained
infectious diseases nurses (n = 41/48; 85.4%), but intensive care
nurses are available in a comparable number of facilities (n = 32/
45; 71.1%) (Figure 3).
All but two facilities indicate 24-hour access to specifically
trained medical and non-medical staff (n = 45/47; 95.7%),
although 72.9% (n= 35/48) only have specific protocols to contact
staff responsible for the operation of the facility. A shift plan to
limit the number of HCWs exposed to patients as well as the
duration of working under hl-PPE exists in 70.8% of facilities
(n = 34/48). Permanent access to technicians was lacking in eleven
facilities (n = 11/48; 22.9%).
Table 1. Number of isolation facilities, existence of High Level Isolation Units, and isolation beds for highly infectious patients per
participating country.
Participating country
Overall number of
facilities enrolled#
Overall number of
isolation beds
Number of isolation beds/million
of population*
Austria 1 24 2.87
Bulgaria 2 64 8.46
Denmark 1 56 10.12
Finland 2 (1) 57 10.65
France 12 (5) 112 1.73
Germany 8 (6) 44 0.54
Greece 6 (1) 20 1.77
Ireland 2 (1) 4 0.89
Italy 2 (2) 5 0.08
Luxembourg 1 15 29.87
Malta 1 3 7.26
Norway 1 (1) 4 0.82
Poland 1 2 0.05
Slovenia 1 2 0.97
Spain 5 38 0.581
United Kingdom 2 (1) 3 0.05
(#): Numbers in brackets indicate the amount of High Level Isolation Units per country, if existing. (*): Total population calculated on the basis of Eurostat [30]. (1):
Facilities enrolled are located in the Catalonia region, only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100401.t001
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Conclusions
All participating facilities were evaluated for their adherence to
recommendations for the operational management of isolation
facilities published [1]. As hypothesized, the level of adherence to
recommendations varied, both within and between participating
countries.
Hence, three categories of isolation facilities representing
different levels of adherence were defined:
(i) High Level Isolation Units (HLIU), defined as operating
independently from other hospital resources and specifically
equipped; (ii) Isolation Rooms, defined as specifically equipped
but only partially independent from other hospital resources; and
(iii) Referral Centers, neither specifically equipped nor functionally
independent.
According to this classification, all facilities enrolled were
categorized as shown in Figure 4. Few facilities completely fulfilled
recommendations for HLIUs (n= 18/48; 37.5%). Six of those are
located in Germany, five in France, two in Italy, and one each in
the UK, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Norway. Such HLIUs are
constructed and equipped for the admission, assessment and long-
term critical care of HID patients.
Most facilities assessed did partially meet the recommendations,
but lacked infrastructural components, or preconditions for
personnel management (n = 25/48; 52%). Such were labeled
‘Isolation Rooms’ considered effective to assess HID patients and
provide short-term medical care until a patient can be transferred
Figure 1. Existence of technical equipment essential for infection control and HCW’s safety. Number of enrolled facilities and adherence
to recommended equipment (overall response n= 48/48). Access to all essential equipment was reported from 34 facilities; negative pressure
existing, but 2 other items missing in 9 facilities; and no negative pressure available in 5 facilities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100401.g001
Figure 2. Access to and location of Intensive Care beds for HID patients. Number of facilities enrolled with Intensive Care (IC) capacity and
location of IC beds (overall response n= 48/48). 33 facilities provide IC beds within the isolation area, and 12 in designated rooms on standard IC
wards.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100401.g002
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to a HLIU. Of these, five each are located in France, Greece, and
Spain; two in Germany; and one each in Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovenia.
The remaining facilities (n = 5/48; 10.4%) are considered to
function as ‘Referral Centers’ where suspected HID cases can be
assessed within daily routine, but even short-term critical care
cannot be provided without an increased risk of nosocomial
infections. Two of such facilities are located in Bulgaria and
France, each, and one in Austria.
Discussion
Within the last decades, autochthonous outbreaks or imported
cases of HIDs have affected Europe with significant impact, and
new pathogens are emerging. Most European countries have
established national response plans including specialised clinical
care facilities for the management of such scenarios [3–7,15–17].
This article presents the first standardised analysis on the
operational management, infrastructure, and technical equipment
of 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries. Data provided
may support national authorities to assess their level of prepared-
ness but have to be adapted to single member states’ needs and
resources. With regard to the implementation of the International
Health Regulations [18], terminology, capacities and equipment
accessible in isolation facility should be documented and
standardised on a European level.
Although all EU member states were invited to join the project
by DGSANCO, only 16 agreed to participate, thus data presented
Figure 3. Access to specifically trained personnel. Number of facilities enrolled with access to specifically trained personnel (overall response
n= 48/48). Access to Infectious Disease and Intensive Care doctors or nurses is provided in the majority of facilities, but specifically trained personnel
for paediatric patients is rarely available.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100401.g003
Figure 4. Classification of enrolled facilities by adherence to EUNID recommendations. Number of facilities classified by adherence to
published recommendations: 18/48 facilities fulfilled the criteria of ‘High Level Isolation Units’ (HLIU); 25 met criteria for ‘Isolation Rooms’ and 5 for
‘Referral Centres’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0100401.g004
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are not representative for the EU in general. A major limitation of
this study is the time elapsed between data collection and
publication: e.g. in Germany one another facility has opened in
the meantime. Hence, a periodical re-assessment of facilities and
countries should be achieved, aiming for a permanently updated
record of national preparedness. In addition, the checklists applied
did not undergo an external validation process (e.g. a Delphi
Cycle) due to limitations of funds and project duration, and
present published guidelines, only. Hence, within the data
collection process, misinterpretations occurred and items needed
to be excluded from the data analysis presented here.
Half of all countries assessed have at least one HLIU according
to the recommendations [1]. Compared to the definition, 18
facilities fulfilled the criteria applied, but the majority of all
facilities enrolled could not operate independently from other
facilities. The high rate of incompliance with the recommenda-
tions depicted here can be explained by the absence of legally
binding documents by the time most facilities were constructed.
After SARS and the US anthrax attacks in 2001, the political will
was to enhance public preparedness, but no standard was agreed
on. Only few countries (e.g. the UK) had specific guidelines at
hand, but the vast majority of facilities were constructed using
laboratory- or operational theatre guidelines adapted to local
needs and infrastructure prerequisites. An earlier inventory of
isolation rooms in Europe by our group faced this problem, when
EU countries were asked to report on negative pressure rooms for
HID patients [19]: The overall number of rooms exceeded most
expectations, but both technical and infrastructural conditions
were not well defined. Hence, an overreporting of any isolation
room’ with available led to the impression of a well prepared
health system, although other aspects of equipment and personnel
were not addressed. Given the definitions for different levels of
isolation facilities proposed now, a reassessment of the EU’s
capacities could lead to more accurate data. Furthermore, the
allocation of funds for hospital’s biological event preparedness has
decreased since the SARS pandemic, and is not harmonised
within the EU. Hence, as our data show, the level of adherence to
the recommendations mirrors the economical situation in the EU,
with the highest level of adherence in the economical most stable
countries. The situation in the United States of America is
comparable: a consensus on the operational management of
isolation units consistent with the European approach exists, but
only three facilities fulfill those criteria, although hospital
preparedness for biological events is mandatory [9,20]. The
contrary can be found in Israel, where the capability to manage
HID patients is mandatory for every public hospital, and
dedicated HLIUs are absent [21].
As HLIUs are designed for single imported cases or small
clusters in the beginning of an outbreak, only, they do not
compensate for surge capacity planning in major biological events
[1]. Besides infrastructure and equipment, additional features
which support effective functioning of such specialised centres
were addressed in this survey and recently published [22–25].
Access to a transportation system for HID patients plays an
important role in distribution of isolation facilities and is reflected
by the overall amount isolation facilities per country. Balancing
the necessary access to a focus of expertise with available transport
logistics leads to either a centralised or a de-centralised approach
to the location of specific facilities, and ambulance dispatch
recording can be of use in early warning systems for outbreak
detection [26].
Most documented HID cases demanded supportive intensive
care [16,17,27], and access to such is considered essential for
HLIUs [1]. In order to allocate funds most effectively, a balance
between infection control excellence and operational feasibility
should be sought. Basic specifications for HLIU provision,
including access to intensive care equipment and trained
personnel, should be developed in order to facilitate a common
standard of best clinical practice. Key issues are the composition of
a permanently available multidisciplinary medical and non-
medical team, the ability and physical fitness to work with PPE,
and reliable timelines and shifts to prevent accidents or mistakes
due to exhaustion [1,28]. Data depicted in this article do highlight
available personnel as the most crucial pitfall in operating isolation
facilities: Compared to the complicane with technical equipment
recommendations, the lack of specifically trained staff is surprising,
especially for HCWs trained in intensive and paediatric care. It
should be mentioned that all facilities with experience in proven
HIDs provide more sophisticated human resources management
such as shift-and surge capacity planning as an outcome of their
experience.
The overall investment for an isolation facility, and HLIUs in
particular, is high, in terms of costs for construction and
maintenance, medical and infection control equipment, human
resources and training activities. Even in time of economical
constraints, employers ‘‘are obliged to ensure the health and safety
of workers’’, as defined by the European Commission [29].
Without adequate protection, HCWs may acquire and transmit
infections, with potential dramatic impact on the health system,
and the economic solidity of a country, as documented during the
SARS epidemic in Canada. For these reasons, we believe that
specialized isolation facilities, and HLIUs in particular, still
represent a critical infrastructure to which each EU Member
State should have access, within the country or through pre-
defined agreements with neighbouring countries where such
facilities are available. Whether such capacities should be reserved
for HID cases, only, or also used on routine basis, is part of an
ongoing discussion. Financial constraints within hospitals and the
host country may benefit from a routine-use concept, although
such facilities demand more frequent maintenence due to damage
on technical equipment. In addition, access to routine use beds for
training of HCWs is reduced, and patients need to be relocated to
other rooms once the facility receives an HID case. In contrast,
reserved bed capacities demand additional personnel and material
for routine functional checks, thus considered cost- ineffective. The
major benefit from reserved capacities is a full access for training
and no delay in patients admission since no evacuation of others is
needed.
The WHO IHRs define the need of preparedness for infectious
diseases outbreaks, but a European, if not international, consensus
on the funding and minimum number of isolation capacities is not
in sight. Although HIDs are rare events, they cause dynamic and
often rapidly evolving issues in need of comprehensive solutions
and may challenge the capacity of healthcare systems. Leadership
and funding at both national and European level are required to
harmonize preparedness plans, terminology and communication
to weaken the impact of future infectious disease outbreaks with
cross-border potential. In order to achieve a balance between
saving lives and protecting HCWs in hazardous environments,
national and international collaboration should continue to share
experiences, and provide standardized training and equipment.
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